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INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has faced 
relatively few major changes in its enabling statu tel during the last 
sixty years. Its procedures largely have been preserved since New 
Deal days. More particularly, judicial review of FCC action has 
changed little since the adoption, over three decades ago, of gen-
eral title 28 procedures for review of rulemaking and other non-
... Professor of Law, New York Law School; Founding Director, Communications Media 
Center. BA, 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D., 1969, Cornell University; LL.M., 1971, Co-
lumbia University; J.S.D., 1979, Columbia University. Particular thanks are due to Mr. 
Fredrik Cederqvist for his help in researching this piece, and to Daniel Goldfisher for his 
assistance in editing it. 
I Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, §§ I, 4-5, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) 
(codified at 47 U.S.c. §§ 151, 154-155). 
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licensing decisions.2 
The Communications Act's provisions for judicial review thus 
appear to represent fragments from past administrative law, espe-
cially with regard to the sometimes vague and often unjustified dis-
tinction between its procedures for review of licensing decisions 
and those for all other decisions, in particular those governing 
rulemaking proceedings. With the advent of the so-called "infor-
mation superhighway," and tentative movement toward amend-
ment of the Communications Act,3 the time might be ripe to refine 
and rationalize the FCC's appellate procedure. The past system 
seems to have worked reasonably well, however, despite its inconsis-
tencies and other warts. 
To date, no secondary literature has addressed judicial review 
of FCC action in any detail. Because of increasing pressure for 
changes to the Commission's organic act, a brief review of this 
somewhat dry area may be useful. Moreover, appellate procedure 
is a difficult area for many FCC practitioners, partially because they 
encounter it so rarely. To begin with, it will be helpful to place the 
FCC's situation in context with general federal procedures for judi-
cial review. 
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTION 
.IN GENERAL 
Unlike some state systems, the federal judicial system has no 
general common law judicial review of administrative action. This 
is not to say, however, that all appeals must have a direct statutory 
basis. As discussed below,4 other forms of indirect judicial review 
are available, although they rarely form the basis of review of FCC 
action. Nevertheless, some form of statute governs most agency re-
view, including virtually every challenge to the Commission's ac-
tions. There are several forms of statutory judicial review in the 
federal system. 
2 Communcations Act Amendments of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-554, § 14, 66 Stat. 711, 
718-20 (1952) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1988), to include by reference the provisions of 
chapter 158 of title 28). 
3 After a bruising battle over the provisions of the 103d Congress' comprehensive com-
munications reform legislation, its sponsor and then chairman of the Senate Commerce 
Committee, Sen. Ernest Hollings, ultimately withdrew the contentious reform bill, the 
Communications Act of 1994, 1994 S. 1822, 103 S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See 
Nicholas W. Allard, Must Carry and the Courts: Bleak House, the Seque~ 13 CARoozo ARTS & 
ENT. LJ. 139, 145 n.19 (1994). Senator Larry Pressler, the new chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, is pushing for reform legislation to be passed early in the 104th 
Congress' tenure. SeeJohn Rendleman, More Specifics Included in Latest Tekcom-Reform Propo-
s~ COMMUNICATlONSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 4; Communications: Pressler, Fields Outline New 
Communications Bill to Governors, WASH. INSIDER (BNA),Jan. 31, 1995. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 6-9. 
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First, an agency's enabling statute may specify a procedure for, 
as well as a standard of, review. Most commonly it is older agency 
enabling statutes, including the Communications Act, that contain 
such agency-specific provisions. 
Second, an enabling act may incorporate a general statutory 
review procedure by reference. A common one, found in the 
Communications Act, is chapter 158 of title 28.5 
Third, general statutes authorize both traditional and modern 
forms of "nonstatutory" relief.6 For example, injunctive and de-
claratory relief may be available where no statutory remedy exists. 7 
In addition, some of the traditional "great prerogative writs" may 
apply. 
As their name implies, the writs were within the sovereign's 
discretion in exercising its prerogative powers over its courts. In 
the context of modern administrative law, the two most important 
writs are mandamus and certiorari. The former allows a court to 
require an administrative official to perform a non-discretionary 
action-for example, to issue a previously-approved license or cer-
tificate.s The Mandamus and Venue Act of 19629 resolved most 
questions regarding the applicability of federal mandamus. By 
contrast, certiorari directs an inferior tribunal-including an ad-
ministrative agency-to transmit the record of a proceeding to a 
higher court for review. State courts use both mandamus and certi-
orari more intensively than do federal courts, since most states 
have relatively underdeveloped systems for judicial review. 
Despite its name and scope, the Administrative Procedure 
ActIO ("APA") does not create any right to judicial reviewY Sec-
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (referred to in 47 U.S.C. § 402(a)). 
6 These procedures are "nonstatutory" in the sense that-unlike the types of statutes 
discussed above-their details are not set out by law. Nevertheless, of course, their exist-
ence and applicability are defined by statute. 
To a limited extent, of course, actions for damages function as a type of judicial re-
view, since they allow a court to pass upon the legal validity of an agency's action and to 
impose the indirect sanction of monetary damages. Because these actions cannot per se 
change an agency's policy and because they are subject to the vagaries of sovereign immu-
nity, however, they provide a relatively limited remedy. 
7 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
8 Indeed, the availability of mandamus reaches back as far as Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), which recognized its existence while refusing on other 
grounds to issue an order to deliver ajudicial commission. 
9 Act of Oct. 5, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-748, 76 Stat. 744 (inserting 28 U.S.c. § 1361). 
10 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993). The sections governingjudichi.1 review are 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. 
11 Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The original 1947 Attorney General's man-
ual on the APA stated that § 701 et seq. "not only does not supersede special statutory review 
proceedings, but also generally leaves the mechanics of judicial review to be governed by 
other statutes and by judicial rules." ATTORNEY GENERAL TOM C. CLARK, UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
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tion 702 expressly states that a party may secure judicial review if 
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning 
of a relevant statute . ... "12 The statute then sets forth procedures for 
judicial review authorized by-but not specified in sufficient detail 
within-other statutes. 
In addition, both general and local rules implement statutory 
review mechanisms. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
("FRAP") set forth relatively specific procedural provisions for the 
Courts of Appeals.13 The Supreme Court promulgates and amends 
the FRAP pursuant to its own statutory authority.14 In addition, 
each circuit court may adopt local "housekeeping" rules, as long as 
the rules do not conflict with title 28 or the FRAP.15 
Finally, the justiciability doctrines derived from constitutional 
litigation-e.g., standing, ripeness, mootness-naturally apply to 
review of administrative actions. They usually do not playa major 
role in administrative litigation, however, because the status of a 
formal agency "case" generally is clear. If an agency has followed 
its statute and rules on a proceeding, usually there is little question 
whether its action is moot, not ripe, etc. To the extent that jus-
ticiability questions do arise, the issue generally involves whether 
the action constitutes a "final order." 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC ACTIONS-IN GENERAL 
Virtually all challenges to Commission action arise under two 
provisions of the Communications Act, each of which provides for 
review at the circuit court level. The first, section 402(b),16 is 
agency-specific, and governs appeals solely from licensing deci-
sions; these matters are cognizable exclusively in the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. 
Acr 93 (1947), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK: STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS 159 (2d ed. 
1992) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]. 
12 5 U.S.c. § 702 (emphasis added). 
13 These provisions govern civil and criminal cases, as well as judicial review of adminis-
trative action. This discussion deals only with the FRAP's application to agency cases. 
14 28 U.S.c. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Hobbs Administrative Orders 
Act was partially a product of the concern over reform of the administrative agencies after 
World War II, which also led to the Administrative Procedure Act and the ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 11. 
The Congress need not approve the FRAP explicitly. While proposed amendments 
must be submitted to the Congress, they automatically take effect if, after ninety days, Con-
gress does not disapprove them, which it rarely does. 
15 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit Rules ("D.C. CIR. R.") specifically state 
that they are "consistent with" the FRAP. D.C. CIR. R. 1. 
16 47 U.S.c. § 402(b) (1988). 
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The second, section 402(a),17 incorporates by reference chap-
ter 158 of title 28, and encompasses all other FCC actions, includ-
ingrulemaking proceedings, policy statements, and complaints. 
These cases may be heard in any circuit in which a petitioner can 
establish venue. As a rough generalization, review of any FCC for-
mal action other than a licensing decision occurs pursuant to sec-
tion 402(a). 
By their terms, the two provisions thus are "mutually exclu-
sive." As the Seventh Circuit has noted, "appeals from orders of 
the Commission in exercising its 'licensing powers' must be taken 
to the District of Columbia Circuit. All other orders fall within the 
general coverage of [section] 402(a). Sections 402(a) and (b) are 
mutually exclusive."18 
Some confusion results where a moving party ~eeks review of 
both a licensing decision and a rulemaking proceeding. For exam-
ple, in Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,I9 a broadcaster sought in-
creased coverage for its station as well as an amendment of the 
rules governing other stations' coverage. Hubbard filed its pro-
ceeding in the Eighth Circuit pursuant to section 402(a) on the 
theory that its appeal involved a rulemaking proceeding. The 
Eighth Circuit held that where a substantial licensing question also 
was involved, a case presumptively should go to the D.C. Circuit, 
noting that: 
[the] FCC's denial of Hubbard's "package" of applications was, 
as a matter of substance, the exercise by [the] FCC of its "radio-
licensing power" re.vie~~ble under section 402 (b) ; further, that 
to permit Hubbard to split off a part of the "package" in a trans-
parent attempt to obtain jurisdiction in a forum other than the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. " . would frustrate 
the clear intent of Congress that judicial review of all cases in-
volving FCC's "radio-licensing power" be limited to [that 
court].20 
As discussed below,21 review of FCC action also is subject to 
the FRAP and the relevant circuit court rules. While the D.C. Cir-
cuit's exclusive jurisdiction makes it the relevant court in alilicens-
ing cases, many rulemaking and other matters also end up in the 
D.C. Circuit. Geographically, it is the closest of the Courts of Ap-
17 47 U.S.c. § 402(a). 
18 Cook, Inc. v. United States, 394 F.2d 84, 86 (7th Cir. 1968) (footnote and citation 
omitted). 
19 684 F.2d 594 (8th Cir.'1982). 
20 [d. at 596-97. 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 63-101. 
322 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 13:317 
peals to the FCC. Until recently,22 this made it an easy target for 
races to the courthouse. Although this consideration is largely ir-
relevant today because of changes in venue statutes,23 some liti-
gants still prefer the D.C. Circuit over other Courts of Appeal, 
because of its perceived "pro-regulatory" jurisprudence-which 
may have waned somewhat in recent years. 
Many aspects of section 402(b) appeals and 402(a) petitions 
for review are identical, under both the FRAP and D.C. Circuit 
Rules. In the interest of brevity, the following discussion cross-ref-
erences those rules and doctrines of sections 402(b) and 402(a) 
that are identical. 
In addition, some challenges to Commission decisions may be 
brought before district courts for injunctive or other relief.24 
Moreover, the Communications Act allows direct actions in district 
court against common carriers, as opposed to broadcasters; section 
20625 allows a district court to award damages and attorneys' fees 
for violation of the Communications Act common carrier provi-
sions. By definition, this section does not apply to broadcasters or 
cable operators. 
Finally, comparatively few justiciability problems arise, particu-
larly under section 402 (b). Although there has been surprisingly 
little discussion, most observers seem to assume that the relatively 
relaxed standing requirements for intervention in FCC broadcast 
licensing proceedings26 also apply to appeals of both licensing and 
rulemaking decisions.27 Financially affected firms, citizens groups, 
and others have little difficulty in meeting standing requirements 
on appeal. To the extent that issues regarding justiciability arise, 
they usually question the existence of a "final order," as discussed 
below.28 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC LICENSING DECISIONS 
Sections 402(a) and 402(b) are discussed separately because 
22 See infra text accompanying notes 124-126. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 119-120. 
24 For example, in Writers Guild of America, West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 
1976), vacated and remanded, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), ceTt. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980), 
the district court held that quasi-formal pressure by the Commission-and particularly its 
chairperson-for broadcasters to adopt a "family viewing policy" violated the First Amend-
ment. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs first should have presented their 
claims to the FCC, and the matter did not go any further. 
25 The statute allows damages for "any act, matter, or thing in this chapter [Tide II] 
prohibited or declared to be unlawful .... " 
26 See infra text accompanying notes 85-89, 129. 
27 E.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 
1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966). . 
28 See infra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
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they differ significantly in many respects. Many statutes and rules, 
however, apply to both-e.g., provisions as to briefs and appendi-
ces. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit, where many section 402(a) ap-
peals ultimately are heard, treats the two types of proceedings 
identically. Similarities are noted as applicable. 
A. Appealable Actions 
Section 402(b) applies only to appeals from the FCC. It gov-
erns virtually any Commission decision relating to a broadcast or 
other license to transmit over the air. It applies not just to licenses, 
but also to construction permits, the Commission's initial authori-
zation to build a station before application for a final license.29 
Moreover, section 402(b) does not restrict appeals to applicants for 
a construction permit or license. Instead, it gives a laundry list of 
licensing decisions that parties are entitled to appeal: 
(1) By any applicant for a construction permit or station li-
cense, whose application is denied by the Commission. 
(2) By any applicant for the renewal or modification of any 
such instrument of authorization whose application is denied by 
the Commission. 
(3) By any party to an application for authority to transfer, as-
sign, or dispose of any such instrument of authorization, or any 
rights thereunder, whose application is denied by the 
Commission. 
(4) By any applicant for the permit required by [47 U.S.C. 
§ 325] whose application has been denied by the Commission, 
or by any permittee under said section whose permit has been 
revoked by the Commission. 
(5) By the holder of any construction permit or station license 
which has been modified or revoked by the Commission. 
(6) By any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are 
adversely affected by any order of the Commission granting or 
denying any application described in paragraphs (1) to (4) of 
this subsection. 
(7) By any person upon whom an order to cease and desist has 
been served under [47 U.s.C. § 312]. 
(8) By any radio operator whose license has been suspended by 
the Commission.30 
Although section 402(b) may appear only to authorize appeals 
29 As discussed later, grant of a construction permit is the first step toward securing a 
license. Only after an applicant has built a station to satisfy the requirements in its con-
struction permit may it apply for a final "covering license." 
30 47 U.S.c. § 402(b). 
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by applicants denied construction permits or licenses, it allows a 
number of other parties to seek judicial review. The language in 
paragraph 6 about "any person ... aggrieved" allows appeals by 
parties adversely affected by the Commission's actions, thus permit-
ting appeals by many parties other than applicants, including those 
filing competing applications or petitions to deny. Nearly any 
party with standing before the Commission31 may invoke section 
402(b) to appeal the grant or denial of a construction permit or a 
license. 
Although the Courts of Appeals tend to take a rather relaxed 
view of standing, they require a party to have participated in an 
agency's pr:oceedings in order to appeal.32 This issue arises most 
commonly in rulemaking proceedings; courts expect parties to par-
ticipate in rulemaking, since considerably less effort is necessary to 
file comments than to enter into a full-blown licensing hearing. 
Just as the Courts of Appe,als seem to use the final order rule as 'a 
substitute for the traditional justiciability doctrine, they use prior 
participation as a non-constitutional substitute for standing 
requirements.33 ' 
B. Exclusive Review'by D.C. Circuit 
Perhaps section 402(b) 's most significant aspect is that.it re-
stricts review to the D.C. Circuit. Although the reasoning behind 
this provision may be lost in history, the apparent goal was to cen-
tralize judicial review of a then "new technology." Former Ch~ef 
Justice Taft-who presided over the: Supreme Court after the en-
actmen t of the Radio Act of 192734-once complained that: 
Interpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to 
interpret the law of the occult. It seems like dealing with some-
thing supernatural. I want to put it off as long as possible in the 
hope that it becomes more understandable before the court 
passes on the questions involved.35 
The need for this type of de facto specialized court is less than clear 
today. To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has developed a formidable 
amount of expertise in communications, and particularly broad-
31 See infra text accompanying note 129. , 
32 E.g., Sierra Club v. United States Regulatory Comm'n, 825 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1987). 
33 E.g., ACLU v. FCC, 774 F.2d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 1985); Sierra Club, 825 F.2d 1356. 
34 Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162. 
35 CLARENCE C. DILL, RADIO LAw 1-2 (1938). The Court's attitude does not seem to 
have changed dramatically over the years, as evidenced by its reluctance to make decisions 
in the area of high-technology-and particularly communications-law and policy. See 
infra text accompanying notes 146-151. 
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casting, cases. But other Courts of Appeals also have skills in this 
area. Petitions for review of rulemakings increasingly have ended 
up in other circuits under section 402(a). Most important, cases 
involving "new media" such as cable television have been brought 
in a number of circuits. Nevertheless, abandonment of the Com-
munications Act's dedication of broadcast-related appeals to the 
D.C. Circuit seems unlikely to change in the near future.36 
C. Filing Procedures under Section 402(b) 
Under sect;ion 402 (b), the filing of a "notice of appeal" initi-
ates review. A notice is a comparatively simple document. It need 
include only a "concise statement" of the "nature of the proceed-
ings as to which the appeal is takt;n" and "the' reasons on which the 
appellant intends to rely," as well as "proof of service of a true copy 
of said notice and statement upon the Commission."37 Service 
upon "interested parties" is required within five days after filing of 
the notice of appeal.38 A notice of appeal usually is extremely 
short-usually only one or two pages-and phrased in very con-
clusory terms. "Fact pleading" is not required. . 
In licensing cases, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty 
days of the Commission's release of "public notice," which consti-
tutes a "final order."39 As with most deadlines for filing appeals, 
the deadline is jurisdictional, and cannot be extended by either the 
Commission or a reviewing court.4O A "public notice" is not just a 
press release,41 which the Commission also publishes on a regular 
basis. It is' a short, one or two page descriptive document explain-
ing the agency's action and rationale. As discussed later,42 in many 
cases issuance of a public notice establishes the deadline for an 
appeal. 
Although the FCC normally publishes a dec;:ision near the time 
it issues a public notice, in some situations there may be a delay 
between the latter and the former, particularly if a case is contro-
versial and preparation of a consensus opinion takes time. If a de-
cision is not released within thirty days of a public notice's 
issuance, an appellant may have to file a notice of appeal without 
36 Randall Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1003 
(1991) (suggesting that specialized courts have fallen out of favor with Congress). 
37 47 U.S.C. § 402(c). . 
38 47 U.S.c. § 402(d). 
39 47 U.S.C. § 402(c). 
40 California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped v. FCC, 833 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 
1988); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 831 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1987). 
41 Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
42 See infra text accompanying note 49. . 
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having the full text of an action. Due to the notice of appeal's 
general nature, this usually is not a major problem. If the full text 
of the decision differs substantially from the public notice, how-
ever, an appellant can protect herself by filing an additional notice 
of appeal; the courts allow multiple notices of appeal from separate 
FCC documents.43 
D. Requirement of a "Final Order" 
Although not by their own terms, both sections 402(a) and 
402 (b) allow appellate proceedings only from a "final order" of the 
Commission. Both provisions use the term "orders," rather than 
"final orders." As incorporated by reference in section 402(a), 
however, title 28 uses the "final order" language,44 and the courts 
consistently have interpreted "order" in section 402(b) to mean "fi-
nal order." 
A final order usually is clear; if no further administrative pro-
ceedings are available and the action will affect a party, there is 
little room for confusion. In some cases, however, the status· of a 
proceeding is less than clear.45 
1. Premature Filings 
First, there may be some question as to whether the Commis-
sion's decision actually will have an affect on the appealing firm. 
This question also may implicate ripeness questions; ripeness and 
the final order doctrine are quite similar, since both focus on 
whether there is an immediate impact on the party that is seeking 
review. Courts thus often treat the issues together, and often reach 
identical conclusions.46 
This result stems from courts' being fairly realistic about and 
receptive to claims that FCC action will have an impact on a party. 
43 In petitions for review the Commission has made issuance of a public notice the 
"effective date" of an action in order to facilitate identifying the deadline. See infra text 
accompanying notes 106-107, 122. 
44 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1988). 
45 For a general discussion of the final order rule, see Romualdo P. Eclaves, Annota-
tion, ~at Constitutes Agent)' "Action, " "Order, " "Decision, " "Final Order, " "Final Decision, .. or the 
Like, Within Meaning 0/ Federal Statutes Authorizing Judicial Review 0/ Administrative Action-
Supreme Court Cases, 47 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1975). 
46 For example, in Office a/Communication a/United Church a/Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 813 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), the court had before it the Commission's denial of a rulemaking petition 
to reinstate the traditional "anti-trafficking" policy, a rule preventing the buyer of a broad-
cast station from selling it within three years of its acquisition. The court held that the 
FCC's action was final, even though the agency had reached an identical conclusion in 
prior proceedings several years before, and that the issue was ripe since the Commission 
had made its position clear. [d. at 816-17. 
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In the early case of Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 47 
the Supreme Court held that the Commission's adoption of rules 
regulating network-affiliate relationships was sufficiently final-as 
well as ripe-to constitute a final order. The Court specifically reo:-
jected the notion that CBS needed to wait until the Commission 
actually enforced the rules against the affiliates. The Court noted: 
If a licensee renews his contract, the regulations ... authorize 
the Commission to cancel his license. In a proceeding for revo-
cation or cancellation of a license, the decisive question is 
whether the station, by entering into a contract, has forfeited its 
right to a license as the regulations prescribe. It is the signing of 
the contract which, by virtue of the regulations alone, has legal 
consequences to the stations and to appellant. . .. If an admin-
istrative order has that" effect it is reviewable and it does not 
cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the Com-
mission will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty in-
curred under its regulations for non-compliance.48 
Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that the Commission's 
adoption of a rule by a formal vote and issuance of a news re-
lease-but not a public notice-constituted a final order.49 The 
court emphasized that "[t]he action taken at [the FCC public] 
meeting was regarded by all the participants as final."50 Where the 
Commission issues a series of orders-as is not uncommon in hotly 
contested adjudications or rulemakings-the only safe approach 
may be to file against every order, and then let the reviewing court 
ultimately decide which one ~as .final. This strategy is aided by 
some courts' willingness to allow a filing against the last order to 
include a challenge to all prior orders, even if they might be con-
sidered final. 51 
Nevertheless, a decision can have a substantial effect upon a 
partY's procedural status and yet not be considered final. For ex-
ample, where an order extended the filing deadline for new fre-
quencies, it increased the number of competing applicants; it was 
not deemed final, however, since judicial review of the ultimate 
47 316 U.S. 407, 417 (1942). 
48 Id. at 417-18. 
49 lIT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). 
sOld. at 1204. 
51 See, e.g., ACLU v. FCC, 486 F.2d 411, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that "even though 
during the proceeding the Commission intermittently issued several orders, each of which 
if considered alone might be considered final, but all of which preceded the ultimate or-
der[,] ... the statute reasonably construed authorizes a petition'for review to be filed within 
sixty days from the date of the Commission's 'final order' ... ."). 
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license grant would be available.52 
2. "Negative Order" Rule 
Second, another problem area in the past involved "negative 
orders," Commission decisions not to take any action on a ma~ter. 
To a large extent, the confusion seems to have arisen from reason-
ing by analogy to grants of m~ndamus.. The courts failed to distin-
guish betweeninactipn reflecting an agency's discretion, and 
failure to decide a bona fide controversy .. 
The Supreme Court largely put an end to the negative order 
doctrine in Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States. 53 In that case a 
telephone company 'petitioned for review of a Commission order 
finding it to be.an interstate carrier under the "control" of the New 
York Telephone Company, and thus pot subject to the exemption 
from federal common carrier regulation for intrastate carriers. 
The Court held that the FCC's order reclassifying the company as 
interstate was not merely a refusal to take discretionary action, but 
rather a decision with immediate legal consequences, such as the 
filing of complex reports and forms.54 . 
Although the negative order doctrine still occasionally crops 
up in FCC appeals, most courts reject it. For example, the Sev~nth 
Circuit has held that an order denying reply. time under the fair-
ness doctrine55 was final, since it effectively defeated the complain-
ant's ability to secure reply time.56 
3. . Timing Issues' 
Although the courts have become increasingly realistic in de-
fining "final order," some degree of uncertainty still exists, creating 
difficulty for litigants in deciding when to seek judicial review. Sev-
eral problems regarding timing exist. 
'First, a party may file after the Commission appears to have 
taken a final action. For example, in Microwave Communications, 
52 Little Rock Television Co. v. FCC, 646 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1981). 
53 307 U.S. 125 (1939). 
54 Id. at 142-44. 
55 The fairness doctrine required broadcast licensees to serve the public interest by 
covering controversial issues in the community, and also to provide balanced coverage of 
those issues. See generally Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(sustaining the FCC's order repealing the doctrine upon its finding that the doctrine did 
not serve the public interest due to its chilling effect on speech), cert. denied, 493 U.S. lO19 
(1990). 
56 Maier v. FCC, 735 F.~d 220 (7th Cir. 1984). Judge Posner dissented on the ground, 
inter alia, that the Commission's denial of a complaint was in the nature of prosecutorial 
discretion-a position not derived from the negative order doctrine. Ill. at 237-39. 
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Inc. v. FCC,57 MCI filed a petition for review of a Commission 
rulemaking proceeding. MCI filed more than sixty days after an 
informal announcement of the agency's action, but less than sixty 
days after the Commission's order denying rehearing. The D.C. 
Circuit held that the petition was timely, reasoning that because 
"administrative reconsideration was timely sought, the filing period 
was extended to the sixtieth day after 'public notice was given' of 
the Commission's opinion and order ... denying rehearing."58 
On the other hand, courts are not sympathetic to parties' 
jumping the gun and filing premature appellate proceedings. The 
problem is not with filing after the sixty day "window," but rather 
that the petition is fil.ed before that window even opens. In these 
types of cases, the D.C. Circuit consistently holds that appeals filed 
before a final order are untimely, even though technically they 
come within sixty days of issuance of a final order. 59 
Related problems arise when the FCC delays in issuing the fi-
nal text of a decision. Although it may be difficult to state the 
grounds of an appeal without a textual decision in hand, it is wise 
to file a notice of appeal from a public notice-not a news re-
lease-if a window is about to close and the Commission has not 
released a final order. A party always can file a later notice of ap-
peal from the text of the order. Some complicated cases with mul-
tiple orders thus generate several notices of appeal, because of the 
uncertainty involved. 
The thirty and sixty day filing windows are jurisdictional in na-
ture and may not be extended by either the Commission or a 
court.60 Failure to make' a timely filing results in dismissal of an 
appeal.61 When in doubt as to the existence of a final order, it thus 
is wise to file. 
Moreover, there is inherent confusion as to the timing of an 
appeal, since section 402 (b) has a filing period of only thirty days, 
while section 402(a) allows sixty.62 It is easy to assume that time is 
57 515 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
58 Id. at 389. 
59 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985); North Am. 
Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 751 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1984). 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 112-114. 
61 E.g., Waterway Communications Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 851 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In 
that case, the appellant filed a "petition for review" (actually a notice of appeal) challeng-
ing the Commission's failure to hold a hearing regarding a grant of licenses to a competi-
tor for marine telephone service. As luck would have it, the appeal was filed be/UTe the 
grant of licenses to appellant's competitors. It thus was untimely, because premature as to 
the license grant. See also National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 760 F.2d 1297, 1298 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
62 28 U.S.C. § 2344. 
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not of the essence for a notice of appeal-with obviously embar-
rassing results. Even where deadlines are not at issue, experienced 
practitioners routinely caption notices of appeal as petitions for re-
view, and vice versa. 
E. Procedure on Judicial Review 
Many issues in this area are identical for sections 402(a) and 
402(b). In most cases the statutory requirements are the same, and 
the FRAP and the D.C. Circuit Rules apply identically. 
1. Motions, Record, and Appendices 
Mter a notice of appeal or petition for review has been filed in 
the D.C. Circuit, the first step is to file a "docketing statement."63 
This gives general information about the case and the parties, on a 
form supplied by the Clerk of the Court.64 . 
The next step commonly is motions by the parties or others-
e.g., motions to strike a notice of appeal or petitions to intervene. 
While the FRAP do not have any general provisions as to motions, 
the D.C. Circuit's rules are quite extensive. Motions and petitions 
may not be longer than twenty pages, with replies limited to ten 
pages.65 Both page and print size are specified.66 The pleading 
cycle is on a fast track, with responses to motions due within seven 
days67 and replies to responses within three days thereafter.68 The 
Clerk of the Court has authority to dispose of "procedural 
motions. "69 
Under the FRAP, the first motion or bnef filed must contain a 
"corporate disclosure statement,'" which informs the court of the 
parties and their relationships. The statement must identify "all 
parent companies, subsidiaries (except wholly-owned subsidiaries), 
and affiliates that have issued shares to the public."70 The D.C. 
Circuit req:uires somewhat more information, including "the repre-
sented entity's general nature and purpose, insofar as relevant to 
the litigation, and if the entity is unincorporated ... the names of 
any members of the entity that have issued shares or debt securities 
to the public. "71 
63 D.C. CIR. R. 15(c). 
64 D.C. CIR. R. 15(c) (2). 
65 D.C. CIR. R. 27(a) (2). 
66 D.C. CIR. R. 27(a)(3); FED. R. App. P. 32. 
67 D.C. CIR. R. 27(c). 
68 D.C. CIR. R. 27(d). 
69 D.C. CIR. R. 27(e)(l). 
70 FED. R. APP. P. 26.1. 
71 D.C. CIR. R. 26.1 (b). 
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The Commission must file the record with the court within 
five days of the notice of appeal.72 In some cases the "record" is 
quite short, in others monstrous. If the FCC has rejected a petition 
to deny a broadcaster's license renewal, the record will consist 
merely of the parties' pleadings and the Commission's usually brief 
decision-a few hundred pages in total. On the other hand, the 
record in a fully litigated comparative hearing often consists of ex-
tensive pleadings, transcripts of several dozen hearing days, and in-
ternal FCC appeals-often tens of thousands of pages. 
For both petitions and notices of appeal, section 2112 of title 
2873-which authorizes the Courts of Appeals to promulgate 
rules 74_governs procedural aspects of the record. Most signifi-
cantly, title 28 allows a "short form" filing procedure, which signifi-
cantly reduces the size of the record on appeal. Section 2112 
provides that rules of procedure "may authorize the agency .. : to 
file in the court a certified list of the materials comprising the rec-
ord and retain and hold for the court all such materials and trans-
mit [them] to the court, when and as required by it .... "75 
Generally, courts require submission of nothing more than the 
"certified list of record items" until after the briefs have been 
filed. 76 Rule 30 of the FRAP defers filing of briefs until twenty-one 
days after the filing of the appellee's brief.77 The parties initially 
may file their briefs with page references to the original docu-
ments, and then substitute them with citations to the deferred ap-
pendix's pagination.78 This can be somewhat expensive. Although 
a party must provide the court ~th only seven copies of its initial 
brief, it must file fifteen copies of its final briefwith the court.79 
The appellant or petitioner must serve upon opposing parties 
a list of items which it proposes to include in the appendix; if the 
appellee requests that other materials be included, the appellant 
must do so at its expense~80 To ensure that appellees do not make 
unreasonable requests, the FRAP allow each circuit court to "pro-
vide by local rule for the imposition of sanctions against attorneys 
who unreasonably and vexatiously increase the costs of litigation 
through the inclusion of unnecessary material in the appendix."81 
72 47 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1988). 
73 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (1988). 
74 Section 2112 governs both petitions for review and notices of appeal. 
75 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a). . 
76 The D.C. Circuit also has adopted this provision. D.C. CiR. R 17(b). 
77 FED. R APP. P. 30(c) . 
. 78 Id.; D.C. CIR. R 30(c). 
79 D.C. CIR. R 3l. 
80 FED. R APP. P. 30(b). 
81 Id. 
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The D.C. Circuit has implemented this by providing that "[c]osts 
shall not be awarded for unnecessary reproduction" and "appropri-
ate sanctions will be imposed ... if the court finds counsel to have 
been unreasonable in including such material. "82 The loss of costs 
for a successful appellant is a significant deterrent. 
The D.C. Circuit may waive the requirement of an appendix,83 
but this is rare in FCC proceedings, since the parties usually have 
ample resources. The Courts of Appeals always are free to take 
notice of public' documents on file at the Commission or any other 
agency. 
2. Intervention 
Intervention is common in licensing proceedings, which usu-
ally involve disputes between competing operators or petitions by 
citizens groups to deny license renewals. If a competitor or a peti-
tioner files an appeal, a licensee usually intervenes in order to pro-
tect its interests. Moreover, other entities involved in the 
proceeding-e.g., competitors-also may wish to become parties 
to the appeal. Although an amicus curiae brief in theory allows 
these parties to be heard, it restricts some of their procedural 
rights-most notably, their right to appellate argument. In addi-
tion, the D.C. Circuit generally does not allow individual parties to 
file amicus briefs; it requires them to join with other parties having 
similar interests.84 
An "interested party"85 may intervene by filing a "notice of in-
tention to intervene" within thirty days after filing of the notice of 
appeal.86 The time frame thus runs behind the deadline for ap-
peal; the triggering event is the filing of the notice of appeal, while 
the window for filing a notice of appeal opens with the Commis-
sion's public notice. In theory, a third party could file a notice of 
appeal after a motion to intervene. 
Like the notice of appeal, the notice of intention to intervene 
is a short pleading that may include highly conclusory statements. 
Unlike most modern federal pleadings, however, it must be sup-
ported by a "verified statement showing the nature of the interest of 
82 D.C. OR. R. 30(b). 
83 D.C. OR. R. 30(d). 
84 D.C. CIR. R. 29(d). 
85 47 U.S.c. § 402(e) (1988). The statute defines "interested party" as "[a]ny person 
who would be aggrieved or whose interest would be adversely affected by a reversal or 
modification of the order of the Commission complained of .... " Id. This generally 
includes all parties participating in the Commission's proceedings. 
86 Id. 
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such party .... "87 This is largely a formality, of course, andgener-
ally consists of a one-page affi,davit from an official within the inter-
vening entity stating that he or she believes the statements in the 
notice to be true. 
This detail often is overlooked, and attracts motions to dismiss 
or to strike-often merely as a form of harassment. Failure to ver-
ify a notice of intervention is not jurisdictional, however, unlike 
failure to file a timely notice of appeal. It may be cured by an expe-
ditious motion to file the required statement nunc pro tunc-a re-
quest that the D.C. Circuit routinely grants. 
While title 28 does not contain any specific provisions as to 
intervention, rule 15 of the FRAP covers the issue for section 
402(a) cases. It requir~s a motion to intervene-not verified-
containing a "concise statement of the interest of the moving party 
and the grounds upon which intervention is sought."88 As under 
section 402 (e), it must be filed within thirty days of the petition for 
review. 89 
3. Briefs and Oral Arguments 
Under both sections402(a) and 402(b), briefs are fairly con-
ventional. The FRAP specify general requirements as to size of pa-
per and type, and require the covers of briefs for appellants to be 
blue, for appellees red, for intervenors green, and for reply briefs 
gray.90 They also set forth general requirements as to jurisdietional 
statements and related matters.91 An interesting 1993 amendment 
requires a brief to state the "~tandard of review."92 
The D.C. . Circuit's rules are somewhat more specific. A brief 
must contain a "Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related 
Cases,"93 including the ce'rtificate as to corporate parties,94 as well 
as a description of the agency proceeding under review95 and of 
any related litigation before any court.96 Excluding introductory 
materials such as certificates, tables, and the like, principal briefs 
may not be longer than 12,500 words, or, if prepared by typewriter, 
fifty typewritten pages. Reply briefs are limited to 6,250 words or 
87 Id. (emphasis added). 
88 FED. R. APP. P. 15(d), 
89 Id. 
90 FED. R. APP. P. 32(a). 
91 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(2). 
92 FED. R. APP. P. 28(a) (5). 
93 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1). 
94 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1)(A). See supra text accompanying notes 70-7l. 
95 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1) (B). 
96 D.C. CIR. R. 28(a)(1) (C). 
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twenty-five typewritten pages.97 The D.C. Circuit seems to take its 
page limitations seriously, "disfavor[ing]" motions that exceed the 
page limits.98 
The FRAP also have general requirements as to oral argu-
ments.99 Among other grounds, a court may decline to hear argu-
ment if it believes that it can decide the case adequately on the 
briefs.lOo Argument is fairly conventional, with the appellant's be-
ginning and concluding the argument. IOI 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF OTHER FCC ACTIONS 
As noted above, section 402(a) provides that appeals of Com-
mission decisions in proceedings other than licensing cases are 
governed by chapter 158 of title 28.102 Section 2342(1) applies to 
all FCC "final orders" other than those in licensing cases. It thus is 
the primary review mechanism for rulemaking actions, policy state-
ments, declaratory rulings, and a wide variety of other decisions. 
As noted, there are differences and similarities between review 
under section 402(a) and 402(b). To begin with, the basic nomen-
clature differs. A section 402(a) proceeding is initiated through a 
"petition for review" rather than a "notice of appeal."103 
Even seasoned practitioners often miscaption a "notice" as a 
"petition," and vice versa. Aside from problems with the relevant 
filing period, this type of mistake normally makes no substantial 
difference, and a reviewing court usually ignores it. Nevertheless, 
it shows the need for thought in filing an appeal from FCC actions. 
Section 402(a) has a more generous filing deadline than SeC-
tion 402 (b)-sixty rather than thirty days. Under title 28, "[a]ny 
party aggrieved by [an agency's] final order may ... file a petition 
to review the order" in any Court of Appeals with proper venue.104 
97 D.C. GIR. R. 28(d). Intervenors and amici curiae are limited to 8,750 words or 35 
typewritten pages, and briefs must be filed within the time limitations described in FED. R. 
APP. P. 29. D.C. CIR. R. 28(e) (3). 
98 D.C. CIR. R. 27(h)(3) & D.C. GIR. R. 28(f) (1). "[Sjuch motions will be granted only 
for extraordinarily compelling reasons." ld. 
99 FED. R. APP. P. 34(a). 
100 FED. R. APP. P. 34(a) (3). 
101 FED. R. APP. P. 34(c). 
102 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section also governs appeals from the 
Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Transportation, the Federal Maritime Commis-
sion, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
The general section 2342 review scheme first was enacted in 1966-thirty-two years 
after § 402(b)-and is somewhat more in line with contemporary judicial review 
procedures. 
103 These terms are a bit obfuscatory, since a "petition for review" is the means of review-
ing many agencies' adjudicatory as well as rulemaking decisions. The distinction at the 
FCC largely is historical. . 
104 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1988). For a discussion as to timeliness of petitions for review in 
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As noted below,105 the choice of venue may be quite broad under 
section402(a), as opposed to the exclusive D.C. Circuit jurisdiction 
under section 402 (b) . 
As with section 402(b), the triggering event under section 
402(a) is a "final order."106 This requirement may be met, how-
ever, by the Commission's issuance of a "public notice" as to an 
action before release of its opinion. l07 
A petition under section 402(a) may be somewhat general. It 
need include only: 
a concise statement of 
(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which, review is 
sought; 
(2) the facts on which venue is based; 
(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and 
(4) the relief prayed. lOS 
The Clerk of the Court then serves a copy of the petition upon the 
Commission and the Attorney General. 109 
The petitioner need attach only copies of the agency actions 
involved in its challenge. As under section 402(b), the Commis-
sion need not file all documents in the proceeding, but rather Just 
a "certified list of record items."l1o Upon filing of a petition for 
review, the moving party must file a copy, date-stamped by the 
court clerk, with the Commission's General Counsel. III 
As soon as the petition is filed, the Court of Appeals has juris-
diction to vacate stay orders or other temporary relief previously 
granted,112 or, if there would otherwise be irreparable harm to the 
petitioner, to issue such an order.1l3 Temporary relief is effective 
for a maximum of sixty days after the Commission's order, "pend-
ing the hearing on the application for the interlocutory injunction, 
in which case the order of the Court of Appeals shall contain a 
general, see Robin C. Lamer, Annotation, When Petition fur Review of Administrative Order 
Under 28 USCS § 2344 is Timely Commenced, 84 ALR Fed. 369 (1987). 
105 See infra text accompanying note 118. 
106 28 U.S.C. § 2344. 
107 ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discus-
sion of "public notices" and filing deadlines, see supra text accompanying notes 41-65. 
108 28 U.S.c. § 2344. 
109 [d. 
110 See supra text accompanying note 76. 
111 FCC General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.13 (1993). This provi-
sion is designed to assist in situations with multiple petitions for review. See supra text 
accompanying note 60. 
112 28 U.S.C. § 2349(a) (1988). 
113 28 U.S.C. § 2349(b). 
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specific finding based on evidence" of irreparable damage. 114 
Once a petition is filed, the Commission loses its power to issue 
stays; only the reviewing court has jurisdiction over temporary 
relief. 
The FCC's enabling statute, and not title 28, specifies the sub-
stantive standard for judicial review under section 402 (a). The stat-
ute states merely that a Court of Appeals may "make and enter ... 
a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting 
aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the 
agency." 115 
A Court of Appeals has a wide variety of procedural options 
under title 28. If the Commission did not hold a hearing below, 
the court may: (1) remand for a hearing, when a hearing is re-
quired by law; (2) "pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is 
not required by law and it appears from the pleadings and affida-
vits ... that no genuine issue of material fact is presented"; or (3) 
transfer the proceedings to an appropriate district court for a hear-
ing, when a hearing is not required by law and a genuine issue of 
material fact is presented.116 The last option rarely is used. Simi-
larly, a court may "adduce additional evidence" de novo if the court 
finds that it is "material" and that there "were reasonable grounds 
for failure" to introduce it before the FCC. 117 
A. Venue 
As noted above, questions sometimes arise in cases involving 
both licensing decisions and rulemaking issues. The quick answer 
seems to be that the D.C. Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction governs, 
and that both matters must be reviewed there-subject to section 
402(b)'s thirty-day deadline. 
Title 28 does not restrict review to the D.C. Circuit, but instead 
sets venue in potentially any Court of Appeals, describing venue as 
in "the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its 
principal office, or, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit."118 Unlike section 402(b), section 
402(a) thus opens up a wide variety of potential fora. Until re-
cently, this encouraged forum shopping. This was particularly 
noteworthy during the 1980s, since the tension between regulation 
114 Id. If the Court of Appeals finds that irreparable damage would result, it can extend 
any temporary relief until its final decision. 
115 28 U.S.c. § 2349(a). 
116 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b) (1988). 
117 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). 
118 28 U.S.c. § 2343 (1988). 
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and deregulation added increasingly heavy ideological overlays to 
Commission decisions. Courts of Appeals were perceived as having 
"political" agendas-for example, the D.C. Circuit as a "liberal," 
pro-regulation court, and the Seventh Circuit as a "conservative," 
pro-marketplace court. 
The availability of multiple venues inevitably creates problems 
when two or more petitioners petition for review of the same order 
in different Courts of Appeals. At one point, this resulted in a 
straight race to the courthouse. Law firms had associates wait at 
the Commission for release of a public notice or order, and then 
race to the airport in attempt to be the first to file in a venue of 
choice. This often resulted in creating venue in the D.C. Circuit, 
the closest circuit court. 
A 1988 amendment to title 28 rendered most of this totally 
irrelevant, by prescribing procedures for choosing a court when 
there are multiple petitions for review filed. 119 The courts en-
couraged the Commission to promulgate rules for determining the 
earliest time at which a petition may be filed. 120 This gives all po-
tential petitioners notice of when a petition can be filed, and thus 
reduces the incentive to stage a race-even if that still were rele-
vant under the 1988 legislation. 
The Commission responded to the courts' invitation for uni-
form rules by pinning release of final orders to relatively easily as-
certainable dates. The FCC did so by defining the "effective date" 
of most non-licensing decisions. 121 This scheme naturally does not 
and could not change the statutory definition of a "final order." 
Nevertheless, the two concepts generally seem very similar; an or-
der presumably is not "final" until it is "effective." In theory, a 
Commission order might be final even if it did not meet the rules' 
definition of "effective date"-as noted before, in situations where 
courts accept the FCC's public announcement of a new policy as a 
"final order." But this situation does not appear to have arisen. 
Under the rules, the date of public riotice is 3:00 p.m. Eastern 
Standard Time on the day after any of the dates below: 
(1) For documents in notice and comment rule making pro-
ceedings[,] ... the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
119 Act of Jan. 8,1988, Pub. L. No. 100-236, § 1(3),101 Stat. 1731, 1731-32 (amending 
28 U.S.C. § 2112(a)). 
120 lIT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 621 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1980). In that case, 
one petition for review was filed on the day that the Commission adopted its decision, and 
two others when the full text was released. The court held that the first date governed, 
since the agency's action was complete in substantive terms at that time. 
121 FCC General Rules of Practice and Procedure, 47 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1993). 
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(2) For non-rulemaking documents released by the Commis-
sion or staff, whether or not published in the Federal Register, the 
release date. A document is "released" by making the full text 
available to the press and public in the Commission's Office of 
Public Affairs. The release date appears on the face of the 
document. 
(3) For rule makings of particular applicability, if the rule mak-
ing document is to be published in the Federal Register and the 
Commission so states in its decision, the date of public notice 
will commence on the day of the Federal Register publication 
date. If the decision fails to specify Federal Register publication, 
the date of public notice will commence on the release date, 
even if the document is subsequently published in the Federal 
Register. See Declaratory Ruling, 51 [Fed. Reg.] 23,059 Uune 25, 
1986). 
(4) If the full text of an action document is not to be released 
by the Commission, but a descriptive document entitled "Public 
Notice" describing the action is released, the date on which the 
descriptive "Public Notice" is released. 
(5) If a document is neither published in the Federal Register nor 
released, and if a descriptive document entitled "Public Notice" 
is not released, the date appearing on the document sent (e.g., 
mailed, telegraphed, etc.) to persons affected by the decision. 122 
The FCC expressly reserves the right, however, to establish an ear-
lier or later date in a particular case. Although it rarely does so, it 
occasionally changes the date in order to ensure that the parties 
and the public are informed adequately of a major rulemaking 
action. 123 
Although these rules previously would have left room for a 
race to the courthouse, today such an effort has no value. The 
1988 amendments effectively took away from the Courts of Appeals 
any value of priority in filing. 
Under section 2112,124 if an agency receives petitions for re-
view in two or more Courts of Appeal, it must notify the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. In turn, the Panel "shall, by 
means of random selection, designate one court of appeals . . . in 
which the record is to be filed, and shall issue an order consolidat-
ing the petitions for review in 'that court of appeals."125 Being first 
in time thus has little or no value today. Although the Courts of 
Appeals presumably still retain their inherent power to transfer a 
122 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(b). 
123 [d. 
124 28 U.S.c. § 2112(a)(3) (1988). 
125 [d. (emphasis added). 
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case for the convenience of the parties,126 in appellate cases there 
usually are no compelling circumstances; after all, only an oral ar-
gument-rather than examination of witnesses or property-is 
involved. 
The same provisions as to filing of the record apply under sec-
tion 402(a) as under section 402(b).127 The whole record thus 
need not be filed with the brief; instead, the FCC files only a "certi-
fied list of record items," followed by ajoint appendix after filing of 
the briefs. 
As with section 402(b) proceedings, intervention is available in 
section 402(a) appeals. Title 28 allows the Attorney General to in-
tervene "as of right. "128 More generally, it allows any "party in in-
terest" to appear if its "interests will be affected if an order of the 
agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended."129 Since 
there are virtually no cases under this provision, its interpretation 
is unclear. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the rela-
tively lenient type of standards under section 402(b) would apply, 
at least to any party having filed comments in a rulemaking or 
other proceeding at the Commission. 
B. Rehearing in Bane 
Finally, in both section 402(a) and 402(b) cases, a losing party 
before a threejudge panel may seek a rehearing in bane, before all 
of the judges in a circuit. The filing must be made within fourteen 
days after the threejudge panel's decision. I30 A party may initiate 
this procedure by filing a "suggestion" of the "appropriateness of a 
hearing or rehearing in banc."I3I A majority vote of all active 
judges is required to grant a rehearing. 132 A "rehearing is not fa-
vored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consider-
ation by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity 
of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of 
126 The venue provisions of chapter 158, 28 U.S.C. § 2343, are silent as to transfers for 
the convenience of the parties. Section 1404 applies only to district courts. Neither provi-
sion, however, seems to negate the Courts of Appeals' traditional forum non conveniens 
powers. ' 
127 28 U.S.C. § 2346 specifies that the filing of the record is governed by § 2112(a)-the 
same provision applicable to the record on appeal under § 402(b). . 
128 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988). 
129 Id. The statute also specifies that "[c]ommunities, associations, corporations, firms, 
and individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in 
any proceeding to review the order." Id. The difference between this clause and the provi-
sion in the same paragraph as to "parties in interest" is less than clear, and very well may be 
non-existent. 
ISO FED. R. APP. P. 35(c), 40(a). 
lSI FED. R. APP. P. 35(b). 
1S2 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
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exceptional importance. "133 A rehearing in banc thus is an ex-
tremely rare form of relief to secure. Aside from its disfavored sta-
tus, the extremely tight filing deadline of fourteen days makes it 
logistically difficult. 
If a party has lost before a threejudge panel and has been 
unable to secure rehearing in banc, its only-albeit unlikely-rem-
edy is a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
V. SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
Under title 28, any "final judgment of the court of appeals" in 
a section 402(a) proceeding is "subject to review by the Supreme 
Court on a writ of certiorari."134 A petitioner must file an applica-
tion for a writ "within 45 days after entry of the order and within 90 
days after entry of the judgment, as the case may be."135 
A writ of certiorari, of course, is totally discretionary with the 
Supreme Court. The Court's rules provide that: 
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only when there 
are special and important reasons therefor. The following ... 
indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a 
decision in conflict with the decision of another United 
States court of appeals on the same matter ... or has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court, as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision. 
(c) When a ... UnitedStates court of appeals has decided 
an important question of federal law which has not been, 
but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided a fed-
eral question in a way that conflicts with applicable deci-
sions of this Court}36 
A petition for certiorari is relatively straightforward. The peti-
tioner must file its application within ninety days of "entry of judg-
ment" by the court beloW.I37 In addition to the usual tables and 
133 [d. 
134 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988); 28 U.S.c. § 1254(1) (1988) (allowing the Supreme 
Court to review a matter by certiorari "upon the petition of any party to any civil or crimi-
nal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree"). 
135 28 U.S.c. § 2350(a). 
136 SUP. CT. R. 10. 
137 SUP. CT. R. 13.1. The Supreme Court's proposed revised rules add that petitions for 
certiorari are timely when filed within the ninety day period "unless otherwise provided by 
law," recognizing that Congress may modify that time period. Proposed Revised Rules of 
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summaries, the petition must contain a "concise statement of the 
case."138 If the petitioner is a corporation, the filing must include a 
statement similar to the certificate required by the FRAP and D.C. 
Circuit.139 The petition must be served by mail on all parties tothe 
proceeding below.140 
A respondent has thirty days from receipt of the petition in 
which to file an opposing brief, which also must be served on all of 
the parties below. l41 Both a petition and a reply brief are limited 
to thirty printed or sixty-five typewritten pages, exclusive of index, 
tables, and the like.142 
In the event that certiorari is granted, petitioner's brief on the 
merits is due within forty-five days of the order, and a reply brief 
within thirty days of the principal brief.143 A deferred appendix is 
available, as under the FRAP and D.C. Circuit Rules. l44 Briefs on 
the merits by petitioner and respondent are limited to fifty typeset 
or 110 typewritten pages, not including tables, summaries, etc.145 
The chances of securing a grant of certiorari, of course, are 
quite slim. Aside from its normal reluctance to hear many cases, 
the Court seems to shy away from high-technology cases in general, 
and communications cases in particular. The situation thus may 
not have changed too much from former Chief justice Taft's re-
fusal to take radio cases. 
Even when the Court grants certiorari, it often renders less 
than comprehensive opinions. Perhaps the most striking example 
of this phenomenon is the Prefer:red Communications146 saga. 
In that case, Preferred brought suit under section 1983147 chal-
lenging the constitutionality of Los Angeles' policy to award only 
one cable television franchise in each geographic area, as well as 
various City programming requirements. The district court dis-
the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 13.1 (Mar. 13, 1995) (proposed effective July 
3, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Sup. Ct. R.]. 
138 SUP. CT. R. 14.1(g) (emphasis in original). 
139 SUP. CT. R. 29.1; see supra text accompanying notes 70-71; see also Proposed Sup. Ct. 
R. 29.6. 
140 SUP. CT. R. 12.4; see also Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 12.6. 
141 SUP. CT. R. 15.2. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 15.3 (establishing a known-ta-all rule 
by allowing respondents thirty days from the date that a petition "is placed on the docket"). 
142 SUP. CT. R. 33. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 33.1 (requiring all documents to "be 
prepared using professional typesetting" rather than typewriting except in cases provided 
for under Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 33.2). 
143 SUP. CT. R. 25.1 & .3. 
144 SUP. CT. R. 26.4. But see Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 26.4 (stating that " [d]eferal of the joint 
appendix is not favored"). 
145 SUP. CT. R. 24.3 & .4; SUP. CT. R. 33.3; see also Proposed Sup. Ct. R. 34. 
146 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986). 
147 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
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missed the case, only to be reversed by the Ninth Circuit. 148 When 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, some observers thought that 
it would define cable operators' First Amendment rights. 149 The 
Court wrote an extremely brief opinion, however, noting that: 
Respondent's proposed activities [building a cable system] 
would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as do the 
activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found to fall 
within the ambit of the First Amendment. ... We do not think, 
however, that it is desirable to express any more detaIled views 
on the proper resolution of the First Amendment question 
raised by respondent's complaint and the City's responses to it 
without a fuller development of the disputed issues in the case. 
We think that we may know more than we know now about how 
the constitutional issues should be resolved when we know more 
about the present [operation of cable systems].150 
The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision, re-
manding the case to the district court for a full trial. Mter a trial, 
the district court concluded that some of the franchise provisions 
were constitutionally suspect, but that Preferred had not shown 
substantial monetary damages. In early 1994, the Ninth Circuit 
once again reversed the district court and remanded the case for 
further hearings as to the damages issuel51-more than seven years 
after the Court's decision. 
A statistical comparison of the Court's willingness to review 
communications as opposed to other cases is impossible. It seems 
fair to conclude, however, that the Court is more receptive to cases 
involving the constitutionality of federal statutes than of federal 
rules or state statutes. In any event, a litigant's chances of a grant 
of certiorari certainly are no greater in communications cases than 
in the general run of cases-that is, virtually non-existent. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial review of FCC action is a bit more complex than that 
of other regulatory agencies, if only because of the Communica-
148 Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
149 The Court had refused to do so in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). In 
invalidating the FCC's "access" rules, the Court ruled solely on the statutory rather than 
First Amendment questions raised by the Eighth Circuit. 
150 476 U.S. at 494-95; see also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 
(1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993) (in which the Court re-
manded to the district court a constitutional challenge to the Must Carry provisions of the 
Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1992). 
151 Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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tions Act's somewhat hoary procedures. The greatest difficulty lies 
not in briefing or arguing a case, but rather in getting it into an 
appellate court in the first place, for two reasons. 
First, the dividing line between· "appeals" of licensing decisions 
and "petitions for review" of other actions sometimes is less than 
clear, and practitioners often do not take the time to determine 
the proper procedure. 
Second, it sometimes is difficult to identify the proper docu-
ment on which to base judicial review, and thus the appropriate 
timing of review. Concepts such as "final order" and the like con-
tinue to plague appellate practice, with no apparent administrative 
relief in sight. 
When an appeal or petition has been accepted in an appropri-
ate court, the process becomes much easier. Title 28's general pro-
cedures usually govern, dictating the relatively familiar and 
straightforward procedure for appendices, briefs, and other similar 
matters. 
After sixty years, the system seems largely to have sorted itself 
out. But this only raises the question whether-in light of possible 
substantive amendments to the Communications Act to accommo-
date new technologies-procedural changes are in order. 
. At this relatively early point, no major changes appear to be 
necessary. To be sure, developments such as "convergence" very 
well may make obsolete the Communications Act's basic distinc-
tion between licensing and other decisions. But these substantive 
trends still are too tentative to justify major procedural changes. 
Despite the existence of some flaws and inconsistencies in the pres-
ent system, it may make sense to leave it unchanged until the form 
of substantive developments in emerging communications 
solidifies. 

